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NOTES
U.C.C. § 2-713: ANTICIPATORY REPUDIATION AND
THE MEASUREMENT OF AN AGGRIEVED BUYER'S
DAMAGES
Early in the common law, when a seller repudiated a contract, the
buyer essentially had no remedy or cause of action prior to the contracted date of performance. Later. decisions, however, permitted the
purchaser to seek a judicial cure by invoking the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation.1 Entitling an aggrieved party to treat any
repudiation as a total breach 2 and to sue as though the date for performance had arrived, 3 the doctrine sanctions recovery of damages for
breach of contract if the breaching party has manifested a clear and
4
unequivocal intention not to perform his agreed obligation.
The Uniform Commercial Code incorporates the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation. 5 The Code provides the aggrieved party with alter1. The doctrine was not fully established until 1853, when Hochster v. De la
Tour, 118 Eng. Rep. 922 (Q.B. 1853), was decided. The court reasoned:
But it is surely much more rational, and more for the benefit of both
parties, that, after the renunciation of the agreement by the defendant,
the plaintiff should be at liberty to consider himself absolved from any
future performance of it, retaining his right to sue for any damage
he has suffered from the breach of it.
Id. at 926.
2. See, e.g., Ringel & Meyer, Inc. v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 511 F.2d 659 (5th
Cir. 1975) (anticipatory repudiation of requirements contract) ; Union Minerals
& Alloys Corp. v. Port Realty & Warehousing Corp., 129 N.J. Super. 41, 322
A.2d 192 (1974) (repudiation of lease); Finnell v. Bromberg, 79 Nev. 211, 381
P.2d 221 (1963) (repudiation of stock purchase option).
3. See, e.g., Higgins v. Kittleson, 1 Ariz. App. 244, 401 P.2d 412 (1965)
(repudiation of contract to exchange ranch for motel); Lufkin Nursing Home,
Inc. v. Colonial Inv. Corp., 491 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973) (repudiation of
installment note). Some jurisdictions, however, have rejected this doctrine, holding
that a repudiation gives the aggrieved party no immediate right to sue for breach
of contract. See, e.g., Tirrell v. Anderson, 244 Mass. 200, -,
138 N.E. 569, 571
(1923) (renunciation or repudiation of delivery contract "is not such a breach
of obligation as gives an immediate right of action").
4. 4 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 973 (1951 & Supp. 1971).
5. Section 2-610 provides an aggrieved party with three options in the event of
repudiation. Section 2-611 establishes the repudiating party's right to retract his
repudiation. Sections 2-502, 2-711, 2-712, 2-713, 2-716, and 2-723 enunciate the
various remedies from which an aggrieved buyer may choose after an anticipatory
repudiation.
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native courses of action in the event of a repudiation, allowing him
either to await performance for a reasonable time or to sue immediately.6 Although an aggrieved buyer may recover damages in either
situation, their precise measurement under the Code is unclear.
Section 2-713 defines the damage measurement formula following a
seller's non-delivery or repudiation as "the difference between the
market price when the buyer learned of the breach and the contract
price." 7 Before he is able to measure his damages, therefore, the
aggrieved buyer must ascertain the exact time after the seller's
repudiation and subsequent failure to perform at which he "learned"
of the breach. The Code offers no direct guidance: it defines neither
"breach" nor "repudiation," 8 and the Official Comments neglect the
question entirely.
Courts and buyers alike, then, must determine the point in time at
which the anticipatory repudiation becomes a breach in order to
calculate properly the aggrieved buyer's damages. 9 Three construc6. Section 2-610 provides:
Anticipatory Repudiation
When either party repudiates the contract with respect to a performance not yet due the loss of which will substantially impair the
value of the contract to the other, the aggrieved party may
(a) for a commercially reasonable time await performance
by the repudiating party; or
(b) resort to any remedy for breach (Section 2-703 or Section
2-711), even though he has notified the repudiating party that
he would await the latter's performance and has urged
retraction; and
(c) in either case suspend his own performance or proceed
in accordance with the provisions of this Article on the seller's
right to identify goods to the contract notwithstanding breach
or to salvage unfinished goods (Section 2-704).
7. Section 2-713 provides:
Buyer's Damages for Non-Delivery or Repudiation
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Article with respect to proof
of market price (Section 2-723), the measure of damages for nondelivery or repudiation by the seller is the difference between the
market price at the time when the buyer learned of the breach and the
contract price together with any incidental and consequential damages
provided in this Article (Section 2-715), but less expenses saved in
consequence of the seller's breach.
(2) Market price is to be determined as of the place for tender or,
in cases of rejection after arrival or revocation of acceptance, as of
the place of arrival.
8. For a discussion of the ambiguous treatment of the term "breach" in the
Uniform Commercial Code see note 81 infra & accompanying text.
9. Many commentators simply have stated that § 2-713 requires measurement
of damages at the time the buyer learned of the breach. Whether these writers
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tions of section 2-713 are possible. Under a "repudiation date" interpretation, the buyer may measure damages as of the time he learned
of the seller's intention to repudiate the contract. 10 An alternative
method focuses on the performance date, measuring damages according to the time performance would have been due under the contract."
Finally, the buyer could use a "reasonable time" measure and fix
2
damages as of a reasonable time following the seller's repudiation.1
This Note examines the various constructions of section 2-713 and
suggests that the third interpretation, requiring the measurement of
damages at a reasonable time after the repudiation, provides the
most flexible and equitable method for ascertaining a buyer's damages
after a seller's anticipatory repudiation. Although none of the constructions can be reconciled perfectly within the structure of the Code,
the reasonable time measure encourages aggrieved buyers to mitigate
their losses, an apparent judicial objective,' 3 and fosters the flow of
commerce by promoting a speedy resolution of contractual disputes.
are aware of the difficulty involved in interpreting this section is unclear. See,
e.g., Coyne, Some Comments on Contracts and the California Commercial Code,
1 U.S.F.L. REv. 1, 9-11 (1966); Gilbride, The Uniform Commercial Code: Impact
on the Law of Contracts, 30 BROOKLYN L. REv. 177, 201 (1964); Hey, Remedies
for Breach of Sales Contract Under the Code, 7 WASHBURN L.J. 35, 41 (1967);
Minish, The Uniform Commercial Code in Minnesota: Articles 2 and 6-Sales
and Bulk Transfers, 50 MINN. L. REv. 103, 124-25 (1965).
10. Several commentators have assumed without comment that damages under
§ 2-713 are measured as of the time of repudiation. See, e.g., Squillante, Anticipatory Repudiation and Retraction, 7 VAL. L. REV. 373, 387 (1973). Others have
expressly approved such a measure. See Project, A Comparison of California
Sales Law and Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code, 11 U.C.L.A.L. REV.
78, 124-25 (1963); Comment, Buyer's Remedies in Sales Cases Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 2 LAND & WATER L. REv. 420, 435 (1967). In Anderson,
Repudiation of a Contract Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 14 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1, 18-19, 24 (1964), the author assumes that § 2-713 requires measurement
of damages as of the date of the repudiation but criticizes the use of this method.
11. Commentators supporting this interpretation include J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 198 (1972); Phalan, Uniform Commercial
Code - Sales - Summary of Buyers' Remedies, 16 U. PITT. L. REV. 209, 211
(1955).
12. This interpretation is supported by Taylor, The Impact of Article 2 of the
U.C.C. on the Doctrine of Anticipatory Repudiation, 9 B.C. IND. & CoMm. L. REV.
917, 929-30 (1968), and Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the
Sale of Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article
Two, 73 YALE L.J. 199, 204-05 (1963). In Davenport, The Nebraska Uniform
Commercial Code: An Introduction and Articles 1 and 2, 43 NEB. L. REV. 671,
720 n.260 (1964), the author assumes that this is the proper interpretation of §
2-713 but refrains from commenting on the desirability of using this measure of
damages.
13. See notes 123, 138 infra & accompanying text.
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THE COMMON LAW DOCTRINE OF ANTICIPATORY REPUDIATION

Rights and Duties of the Aggrieved Party
Damage awards for breach of contract at common law were
designed to place an aggrieved party in the position he would have
held if the breaching party had performed fully. 14 Accordingly, compensatory damages resulting from a seller's anticipatory repudiation
were calculated as the difference between the contract and the market
prices on the date of performance. 15 To ensure that the aggrieved
buyer received no more than the benefit of his bargain, however,
courts disallowed the accumulation of damages 11 that could have been
avoided by reasonable effort, without risk of substantial loss. 1 7 Consequently, a principle of mitigation, the doctrine of avoidable conse8
quences, emerged under the common law.1
The majority of courts found no inconsistency in measuring damages as of the performance date while simultaneously requiring mitigation of losses.'9 Rejecting the argument that mitigation imposed a
duty on the aggrieved party to "cover" after repudiation by purchasing substitute goods, 20 the courts required only that the injured party
take no affirmative action to increase his losses. 2' The early case of
Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge Co. 22 illustrated the application of
the doctrine of avoidable consequences. The plaintiff contractor in
Luten Bridge had just begun construction of a bridge when the defendants repudiated the agreement.2 3 Nevertheless, the plaintiff con14. 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 4, § 992.
15. G.E.J. Corp. v. Uranium Aire, Inc., 311 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1963); MeJunkin
Corp. v. North Carolina Natural Gas Corp., 300 F.2d 794 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 830 (1962); In re Marshall's Garage, Inc., 63 F.2d-759 (2d Cir. 1933).
16. 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 4, § 1039.
17. Id.
18. Corbin states: "[L]ikewise, gains that [the aggrieved party] could have
made by reasonable effort and without risk of substantial loss or injury by
reason of opportunities that he would not have had but for the other party's
breach are deducted from the amount that he could otherwise recover." Id.
19. Id.
20. Cover was required, however, to mitigate consequential damages. See notes
45-46 infra & accompanying text.
21. See 4 A. CORBIN, supra note 4, § 983. See also notes 23-25 infra & accompanying text.
22. 35 F.2d 301 (4th Cir. 1929).
23. The Board of Commissioners of Rockingham County, which voted to
award the plaintiff company a contract for construction of the bridge, subsequently resolved to notify the company "that any work done on the bridge would
be done by it at at its own risk and hazard." At the time of the repudiation,
the company had expended approximately $1,900 on labor and materials. Id. at
303.
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tinued construction and, upon completion, sued for the contract price.2 4
Reversing the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiff builder was entitled to recover
only an amount comprised of his expenses prior to the repudiation and
his expected contractual profits. 25 Upon the defendants' breach all
construction should have ceased and the contract should have been
treated as terminated.
Although the aggrieved party could not undertake activity increasing the breaching party's damage liability, he was under no converse
duty to cover after a repudiation. 26 For example, in Reliance Cooperage v. Treat,27 a seller of barrel staves repudiated a contract shortly
after it had been signed. 28 Notwithstanding the seller's refusal to perform, the buyer awaited delivery and brought an action after the performance date, by which time the price of staves had risen substantially. 29 The Eighth Circuit rejected the contention that the buyer
was obligated to cover.30 It held that damages were to be calculated
24. The plaintiff alleged that the county was indebted in the amount of
$18,301.07. Id.
25. The court stated:
His remedy is to treat the contract as broken when he receives the
notice, and sue for the recovery of such damages as he may have
sustained from the breach, including any profit which he would have
realized upon performance, as well as any other losses which may
have resulted to him. In the case at bar, the county decided not to
build the road of which the bridge was to be a part, and did not
build it. The bridge, built in the midst of the forest, is of no value
to the county because of this change of circumstances. When, therefore, the county gave notice to the plaintiff that it would not proceed
with the project, plaintiff should have desisted from further work.
It had no right thus to pile up damages by proceeding with the
erection of a useless bridge.
Id. at 307.
26. See note 20 supra & accompanying text.
27. 195 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1952).
28. Id. at 978.
29. The defendant-seller had contracted to deliver 300,000 barrel staves at
$450 per, thousand. The market price of staves, which began to rise in August,
was found to be as high as $750 per thousand by December, the agreed time of
delivery. Id. at 979-80.
30. The jury in the court below had been instructed:
That if the plaintiff by a reasonable effort and without undue risk or
expense, after the repudiation, if any, by the defendant of the contract prior to December 31, 1950, could have purchased the staves on
the open market at a price in excess of the contract price, then it
was the plaintiff's duty to do that and mitigate its damages so far
as possible, and the plaintiff would then be entitled to damages only
for the difference between the market price of the staves at that time
and the contract price.
Id. at 981.
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according to the price of staves on the performance date, 31 regardless
32
of an interim opportunity to obtain less expensive substitute goods.
Common law courts rigidly followed the measure of damages espoused in Reliance Cooperage. Even when an aggrieved party covered
after repudiation, his compensable losses could never exceed the
amount that would have been recoverable under a performance date
3 4
damage measurement. 33 In Missouri Furnace Co. v. Cochran,
which
involved a repudiation by the defendant seller of coke, the plaintiff, in
a rising market, purchased substitute coke at a price greatly exceeding
that provided by the agreement and sued for the difference between
the contract and cover prices. By the time of the contracted dates
of performance, however, the price of coke had returned to its original
31. Id. at 982.
32. The court concluded:
The doctrine of anticipatory breach by repudiation is intended to aid
a party injured as a result of the other party's refusal to perform
his contractual obligations, by giving to the injured party an election
to accept or to reject the refusal of performance without impairing
his rights or increasing his burdens. Any effort to convert the
doctrine into one for the benefit of the party who, without legal
excuse, has renounced his agreement should be resisted.
Id. at 983.
33. If a buyer covered prior to the performance date, however, and the price
of the substitute goods was less than the market price on the delivery date, he
could recover as damages only the difference between the contract and cover
prices. See Hebron Mfg. Co. v. Powell Knitting Co., 171 F. 817 (3d Cir. 1909).
Such a result clearly was appropriate because it awarded no damages for losses
that the buyer had avoided by reason of his cover. In a few other circumstances
courts also awarded damages based on the buyer's cover price. Thus, the amount
paid for substitute goods purchased after the delivery date was admissible as
evidence of the market price existing on the date of performance, Sawyer v.
Eaton, 293 F. 898, 899 (1st Cir. 1923), and could have been used in the calculation of damages if the cover had been reasonable. See Joseph Denunzio Fruit Co.
v. Crane, 79 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Cal. 1948), aff'd on other grounds, 188 F.2d 569
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 820 (1951), 344 U.S. 829 (1952).
In addition, ascertaining damages as the difference between the contract and
cover prices also was allowed when authorized by either the contract itself or a
usage of trade. See, e.g., Keystone Steel & Wire Co. v. Price Iron & Steel Co., 345
Ill. App. 305, 103 N.E.2d 143 (1952) (damages fixed by agreement between the
parties); United Sales Co. v. Curtis Peanut Co., 302 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Ct. App.
1957) (damages fixed according to usage of trade). Finally, this measure of
damages was applied in a case involving a seller's repudiation of his contract to
provide flour for the United States Government. In United States v. U.S. Foreign
Corp., 151 F. Supp. 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), the Government had purchased substitute flour for export.' Because the Government needed to discharge its obligations immediately, the court measured damages as the difference between the
contract price and the cost of replacement goods. Id. at 660.
34. 8 F. 463 (W.D. Pa. 1881).
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level, 35 and the court refused to award damages based on the cover
price. Faithful to the strict common law philosophy that damages
should place the aggrieved party in a position no more advantageous
than he would have occupied had the contract been performed in full,
the court held that damages must be fixed as of the agreed time of
36
performance.
The buyer's noncompensable losses in Missouri Furnace stemmed
from the decline in market price after cover had been completed but
before performance was due. The risk of such market fluctuations and
the disposition of the case itself have been cited as justifying the common law position that a buyer need not cover after repudiation. 1 Such
an argument, however, failed to recognize that the buyer's nonrecoverable losses were occasioned not by the market fluctuation per se but
by the damage measurement used. Had the court permitted the buyer
to measure his damages according to the price paid for the substitute
goods, he would have incurred no risk.
The absence of a common law cover requirement may have resulted
from other considerations. For instance, during a period of market
fluctuation such as that in Missouri Furnace,substitute purchases by
the buyer might increase the breaching party's damage liability.3 8 Because such action by the aggrieved party could as easily maximize as
minimize the resulting damages,3 9 common law courts may have been
reluctant to impose a duty to cover. 40 In addition, a cover requirement
would force the innocent purchaser to ascertain whether a repudiation
35. Id. at 463-64.
36. The court reasoned that:
The rule that the damages are to be assessed with reference to the
times the contract should be performed, furnishes, I think, a safe
and just standard from which it would be hazardous to depart ....
The good faith of the plaintiff in entering into the new contract

cannot be questioned, but it proved a most unfortunate venture.
Id. at 467.
37. See Callan v. Andrews, 48 F.2d 118, 120 (2d Cir. 1931); Second Nat'l
Bank v. Columbia Trust Co., 288 F. 17, 26-27 (3d Cir. 1923); York-Draper Mercantile Co. v. Lusk, 6 Kan. App. 629, -,
49 P. 788, 790 (1897).
38. In Continental Grain Co. v. Simpson Feed Co., 102 F. Supp. 354, 363 (E.D.
Ark. 1951), aff'd as modified, 199 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 1952), for example, the

court stated that if the aggrieved party were forced to cover "the immediate
action of the innocent party might not have the effect of mitigating his damages,
but might, on the other hand, enhance them."
39. 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 4, § 1039.
40. Professors Corbin and Williston believed that the uncertainty of market
prices constituted a valid justification for refusing to require cover after a
repudiation. 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 4, § 1053; 11 S. WILUSTON, CONTRACTS §
1397 (1968).
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actually had occurred. 41 Substantial losses could result from an inaccurate determination of this question, 42 and the common law does not
43
compel an injured buyer to take actions involving a risk of loss.
Finally, because a repudiating seller could purchase substitute goods
and thereby limit his own damage liability resulting from future price
increases, the courts may have been unwilling to extend the doctrine of
mitigation of losses to include a requirement that an innocent buyer
44
cover after a repudiation.
Of the reasons for the absence of a common law cover obligation,
only the possibility of increasing the breaching party's damage
liability explains the courts' refusal to compensate the buyer for his
entire losses in the event that the actual cost of his substitute goods
exceeds their market price on the date of delivery. The latter two justifications, that the seller himself could cover and that the buyer need
take no risks, suggest only why cover was not required and fail to
explain why it was unavailable as a buyer option.
ConsequentialDamages: Rights and Duties of the Aggrieved Party
The concept of cover was not unknown at common law. To the
contrary, when an aggrieved buyer originally contracted for goods
with the intention of resale, he could not recover consequential
damages for lost profits unless he first sought substitute goods with
41. 4 A. CORBIN, supra note 4, § 973.
42. For example, a buyer who covered erroneously believing that a repudiation
had occurred might obligate himself under two contracts rather than one. Alternatively, a buyer who failed to comply with a cover requirement while assuming incorrectly that a repudiation had not occurred would be injured to the extent
that the market price subsequently rose.
43. See text accompanying note 37 supra. The Uniform Commercial Code
largely eliminates the risk of incorrectly determining when a repudiation has
occurred. See U.C.C. § 2-609, which permits either party to a contract, having
reasonable grounds to believe that the other party will not perform, to demand
"adequate assurance" of future performance. A failure to provide such assurance
within a reasonable period of time, not to exceed 30 days, lapses into a repudiation of the contract. Moreover, at least one court appears to have construed the
Code to require unambiguous action to establish a repudiation. See Farmers
Elevator Co. v. Lyle, S.D. -,
238 N.Y.2d 290 (1976) (repudiation did not
occur until seller reiterated his intention not to perform because buyer, in good
faith, refused to believe the seller's first pronouncement).
44. Corbin contends that the seller's ability to obtain substitute goods eliminates the need for the aggrieved party to cover. 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 4, § 1053.
In a further justification for the common law rule, Williston suggests that an
innocent buyer should not be forced to enter into substitute contracts that bind
his resources and credit. 11 S. WILLISTON, supra note 40, § 1397.
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which to make -his own deliveries. 45 Moreover, consequential damages
would be awarded only in those situations in which the injured pur46
chaser could not obtain cover.

Thus, if damages for lost profits were desired by the buyer confronted with a common law anticipatory repudiation, he was required
to seek substitute goods. If only compensatory damages were involved,
however, such attempts to cover created dangers of monetary loss. The
distinction between these results derives from the common law
standard for measuring damages. In resale situations, the buyer
could avoid the risk of market fluctuations by covering after the
delivery date, when the market price already would have become a
matter of record. Conversely, when substitute goods were purchased
prior to the date of performance, similar protections were unavail47

able.

Under the Uniform Commercial Code, however, the risks associated
with cover prior to the performance date have been eliminated by section 2-712,48 and the Code expressly permits an aggrieved buyer to
purchase substitute goods after repudiation. 49 The Code's cover pro45. See, e.g., Henderson v. Otto Goedecke, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 120, 123 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1968).

46. 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 4, § 1039.
47. See notes 33-37 supra & accompanying text.
48. U.C.C. § 2-712. For text of the provision see note 80 infra.
49. U.C.C. § 2-711(1) (a). Section 2-711 provides:
Buyer's Remedies in General; Buyer's Security Interest in Rejected

Goods
(1) Where the seller fails to make delivery or repudiates or the
buyer rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes acceptance then with
respect to any goods involved, and with respect to the whole if the
breach goes to the whole contract (Section 2-612), the buyer may
cancel and whether or not he has done so may in addition to recovering so much of the price as has been paid
(a) "cover" and have damages under the next section as
to all the goods affected whether or not they have been
identified to the contract; or
(b) recover damages for non-delivery as provided in this
Article (Section 2-713)
(2) Where the seller fails to deliver or repudiates the buyer may
also
(a) if the goods have been identified recover them as
provided in this Article (Section 2-502) ; or
(b) in a proper case obtain specific performance or
replevy the goods as provided in this Article (Section
2-716).
(3) On rightful rejection or justifiable revocation of acceptance
a buyer has a security interest in goods in his possession or control
for any payments made on their price and any expenses reasonably
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vision should have a significant bearing on the interpretation of section 2-713, regarding the time of breach: given the acceptance of cover
as a remedy and the concomitant removal of the common law risks
accompanying the purchase of substitute goods, a strict adherence to
the performance date measure of damages for a seller's anticipatory
repudiation may be unjustifiable.
Date of Breach by Anticipatory Repudiation
In the event of a common law anticipatory repudiation, the aggrieved party could avail himself of several remedial options.50 He
could elect either to sue immediately 51 or to bring an action at any
time after the repudiation, 52 provided only that the contract had not
been reinstated. 53 Such a restoration of the contract could occur when
the breaching party made a valid retraction before the injured buyer
had changed his position materially or otherwise acquiesced in the
54
repudiation.
As a result, if no retraction occurred, the repudiation might be regarded as a breach at any of three different times. 55 First, because the
incurred in their inspection, receipt, transportation, care and custody
and may hold such goods and resell them in like manner as an
aggrieved seller (Section 2-706).
50. See notes 51-56 infra & accompanying text.
51. 4 A. CORBIN, supra note 4, § 959.
52. Id. See also Bu-Vi-Bar Petroleum Corp. v. Krow, 40 F.2d 488, 493 (10th
Cir. 1930); Continental Cas. Co. v. Boerger, 389 S.W.2d 566, 569 (Tex. Ct. App.
1965).
53. By retracting the repudiation, the breaching seller could reinstate the contract, thus restoring the rights and obligations of both parties. 4 A. CORBIN, supra
note 4, § 980.
54. Id. Under English law, an anticipatory repudiation had to be formally
"accepted" by the aggrieved party before it constituted a breach of contract.
Without an acceptance, all of the contractual rights and duties were maintained.
4 A. CORBIN, supra note 4, § 981. In the United States, however, a formal acceptance generally was unnecessary. If the injured party materially changed his
position, either through the instigation of legal action or by some other means,
then the repudiation .ripened into a breach. See, e.g., Guerrieri v. Severini, 51
Cal. 2d 12, -,
330 P.2d 635, 641 (1958). See generally Comment, Anticipatory
Breach of Contract: A Comparison of the Texas Law in the Uniform Commercial
Code, 30 Tnx. L. REv. 744, 749 (1952). American courts also apply the term
"acceptance" to refer to the aggrieved party's right of election either to sue
immediately or to await the time of performance. This dual meaning continues to
cause judicial confusion. See, e.g., Continental Cas. Co. v. Boerger, 389 S.W.2d
566, 569 (Tex. Ct. App. 1965).
55. The principle of election is discussed in Continental Grain Co. v. Simpson
Feed Co., 102 F. Supp. 354 (E.D. Ark. 1951), aff'd as modified, 199 F.2d 284 (8th
Cir. 1952). In a suit for seller's breach of contract, the court quoted at length
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repudiation gave rise to an immediate right to sue, the date of the
breach could be the actual date on which the buyer learned of the
seller's refusal to perform. Second, because the aggrieved party might
decline to consider the repudiation as final, his subsequent acquiescence in the seller's action would determine the time of the breach.
Third, if the buyer chose to await performance, the repudiation would
not ripen into a breach until the contractual delivery date.50
from Belisle v. Berkshire Ice Co., 98 Conn. 689, 120 A. 599 (1923), which involved
a buyer's repudiation of a contract to sell ice:
"On September 3, 1919, (the) defendant absolutely, distinctly, and
unequivocally refused to perform its promise, and gave unmistakable
evidence of its renunciation. But this did not make a breach of this
contract. It remained a subsisting contract unless and until the other
party, the plaintiff, gave equally unmistakable evidence of his
acquiescence or acceptance of the defendant's repudiation. * * *
"The record before us does not show that the plaintiff had accepted
or acquiesced in this defendant's repudiation of this contract. Therefore it was never broken. By its terms it remained in uninterrupted
existence until November 1, 1919. At any time until that day this
defendant, notwithstanding its letters to the plaintiff, had the right
to take the entire quantity of ice specified in its contract. By its
refusal to exercise that right within the time limited, it broke its
contract on the last day fixed. The trial court correctly held that the
breach was made on November 1, 1919. * * *

"When (plaintiff) received notice of this defendant's repudiation of
[its] contract, the plaintiff had the right to choose whether he would
adopt the repudiation or would treat the contract as still subsisting
and assume that this defendant would perform its part before the
time for such performance should expire. He chose to follow the
latter course. Hence a breach of the contract by this defendant alone
did not occur until the time for performance by it had come and
passed, and not until then would a cause of action on the contract
arise."
102 F. Supp. at 362-63, quoting from 98 Conn. at -, 120 A. at 602. See also Daum
v. Superior Ct., 228 Cal. App. 2d 283, -,
39 Cal. Rptr. 443, 446-47 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1964).
56. Corbin suggests that, for a repudiation to become a breach, it need not be
accepted. Clearly, however, he was referring to the English rule, see note 54
supra, which required the injured party to accept a repudiation formally. 4 A.
CORBIN, supra note 4, § 981. The American rule requires the aggrieved party to
take some action, amounting to less than a formal acceptance, that unequivocally
manifests his intention to close the contract. A review of the cases cited by
Corbin reveals that the English formula was rejected explicitly only once,
Bu-Vi-Bar Petroleum Corp. v. Krow, 40 F.2d 488, 492 (10th Cir. 1930), but all
of the courts upheld the principle of election. See, e.g., Lagerloef Trading Co. v.
American Paper Prods. Co., 291 F. 947, 954 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 263 U.S. 706
(1923) ("Seller's act of bringing suit . . . converted the anticipatory rejection
into an anticipatory breach."); United Press Ass'n v. National Newspaper Ass'n,
237 F. 547, 553 (8th Cir. 1916) ('[Wjhere one party repudiates a contract . ..
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With respect to the common law measurement of damages, which
always have been quantified according to the contract's performance
date, the determination of when an anticipatory repudiation actually
becomes a breach is largely academic. Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, however, the issue is crucial for a proper analysis of section
2-713. Damages under that provision are measured on the date the
buyer "learned of the breach." Therefore, an injured buyer must
ascertain precisely when a repudiation becomes a breach within the
meaning of the statute: on the repudiation date, on the performance
date, or at some intermediate time.
POSSIBLE INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTION

2-713

Damages Measured as of the Performance Date
In accordance with the common law 5"and the legislative history of
the Code, section 2-713 may be construed as directing that damages
be measured on the date that performance was due under the contract.
Although two additional Code provisions support this interpretation,
an equal number do not ;58 further, the inconsistencies within the Code
resulting from a performance date rationale commend abandonment
of the common law damage measure.
The legislative history of section 2-713 suggests that its drafters
intended to continue the common law practice of measuring damages
as of the performance date. The current codification derives from
section 67 (3) of the Uniform Sales Act (USA), which states:
Where there is an available market for the goods in question,
the measure of damages, in the absence of special circumstances showing proximate damages of a greater amount, is
the difference between the contract price and the market or
current price of the goods at the time or times when they
ought to have been delivered ....59
the injured party has an election to pursue one of three remedies: First, he may
treat the contract as rescinded, and recover upon quantum meruit . .. ; second,
or he may keep the contract alive for the benefit of both parties .. . ; third, or he
may ... sue to recover . . . for the profits he would have realized . . . .") ; Louisville Packing Co. v. Crain, 141 Ky. 379, -,
132 S.W. 575, 579 (1910) ("[I]f
one of the contracting parties elects not to accept the breach or renunciation, but
continues to insist upon the performance of the contract according to its terms,
then the contract remains open . . ").
57. See notes 14-15 supra & accompanying text.
58. Although §§ 2-723 and 2-711 provide inferential support for a performance
date measure, §§ 2-610 and 2-712 conflict with such an interpretation. See notes
75-85 infra & accompanying text.
59. UNIFORM SALEs ACT § 67(3) (1906).
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The USA thus codified the common law damage measure, and section
2-713's initial version, in which the drafters intended "to clarify the
former rule," 60 provided: "(1) The measure of damages for nondelivery is the difference between the price current at the time the
buyer learned of the breach and the contract price." 61
The USA's "special circumstances" provision may be equated with
the language in section 2-713 regarding when "the buyer learned of
the breach." 62 For example, in New York, under section 67 (3) of the
USA, if a buyer did not learn of his seller's refusal to deliver until
after the date of performance, the courts measured damages according
to the market price of the goods at the time the purchaser actually
learned of the breach. 3 Such a situation involved special circumstances authorizing a potentially higher damage recovery than otherwise would result from a performance date measure, and the language
in section 2-713 appears to codify the New York courts' interpreta64
tion of the USA.
Moreover, by stating section 2-713's original damage measure in
terms of nondelivery, the Code's drafters apparently assumed that the
buyer could not learn of the breach within the meaning of the section
until the performance date or a time thereafter. In support of this
conclusion, the Official Comment to the initial version of section 2-713
merely reiterates that damages are measured at "the time at which
the buyer learns of the breach." 05 The Comment provides no indication that its drafters intended to modify the common law rule by
60. U.C.C. § 2-713, Comment (1952 version).

61. U.C.C. § 2-713 (1952 version).
62. See Patterson, I N.Y. LAw REVISION CoMM'N REP. 698-99 (1955). In discussing the 1952 version of § 2-713 Patterson stated:
The present New York statute .

.

. fixes the market value as of the

time when the goods "ought to have been delivered"... . The proposed
statute would make "the time when the buyer learned of the breach"
determine the market price. This is apparently a change in New York
law; but actually it probably is not a change in the law as applied by
New York courts. In at least two New York cases it was held that
the market value was to be measured as of the time when the buyer
knew of the default.
Id. at 698 (citation & footnote omitted).
63. See Perkins v. Minford, 235 N.Y. 301, 139 N.E. 276 (1923) ; Boyd v. L.H.
Quinn Co., 18 Misc. 169, 41 N.Y. Supp. 391 (App. Term 1896).
64. See Patterson, supra note 62, at 698-99.
65. U.C.C. § 2-713, Comment 1 (1952 version). Comment 1 provides:
Purposes of Changes: To clarify the former rule so that:
1. The general baseline adopted in this section uses as a yardstick
the market in which the buyer would have obtained cover had he
sought that relief. So the place for measuring damages is the place
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requiring the calculation of damages existing at a time prior to the
date of delivery.
In 1962 section 2-713 was modified to provide specifically for
damages created by a seller's repudiation or nondelivery, thus incorporating the New York Law Revision Commission's earlier suggested
modifications. Failing either to revise the section's language requiring
that damages be measured at the "time when the buyer learned of the
breach" or to offer a new interpretation of that provision in the Official
Comment, however, the amendment introduced an element of ambiguity into the text of section 2-713. Depending on whether a situation involved a repudiation or a nondelivery, a breach apparently
could occur under different circumstances at a variety of times; accordingly, damages possibly could be measured at a date earlier than
the time of delivery.6 Such a deviation from the longstanding damage
measures under the common law and the USA certainly would have
required further explanation in the Comment,0 7 and the Commission's
silence on this question indicates both its failure to recognize the
ambiguity and its intention to retain the preexisting rules.
The primary reasons for modifying section 2-713 provide additional
support for this view. In its report, the Commission "suggested that
section 2-713 be revised . . .to refer to repudiation as well as non-

delivery [and] to recognize that the rule as to the measure of damages
based on market price is governed by Section 2-723 in certain cases." 68
The Commission recognized that section 2-723 governs the calculation
of damages for anticipatory repudiation in suits reaching trial before
a contract's date of performance 9 but that section 2-713 provides the
damage measure in court actions after the time of delivery. Section
2-723 requires that damages "shall be determined according to the
of tender (or the place of arrival if the goods are rejected or their
acceptance is revoked after reaching their destination) and the

crucial time is the time at which the buyer learns of the breach.
66. See Project, A Comparison of CaliforniaSales Law and Article Two of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 11 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 78, 124-25 (1963), in which the
authors assume that damages should be measured at the time the buyer could
have covered and that § 2-713 requires damages to be measured as of the date
of the repudiation.
67. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 200.
68. N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM'N REP. 399 (1956).
69. Section 2-723 provides in pertinent part:
(1) If an action based on anticipatory repudiation comes to trial
before the time for performance with respect to some or all of the
goods, any damages based on market price (Section 2-708 or Section
2-713) shall be determined according to the price of such goods prevailing at the time when the aggrieved party learned of the repudiation.
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price of such goods prevailing at the time when the aggrieved party
learned of the repudiation." 7o Accordingly, unless section 2-713 establishes a damage measure based on the market price on the performance
date, rather than at the time of the repudiation, it could render section
2-723 superfluous insofar as that provision might apply in a situation
71
involving a seller's anticipatory repudiation.
The Commission's concern that section 2-713 refer to repudiation as
well as to nondelivery resulted from its attempt to synchronize the
language of that provision with the terms of section 2-711.72 If a seller
"fails to make delivery or repudiates," section 2-711 permits the buyer
to recover damages in accordance with section 2-713. 73 Referring only
to the buyer's ability to obtain "damages for non-delivery," 74 however,
section 2-711 apparently presumes that, in both nonperformance and
repudiation situations, damages will be calculated as of the date delivery was due under the contract.
Reconciliation of a section 2-713 performance date interpretation
with other Code provisions nevertheless is difficult. Section 2-610, for
example, provides an aggrieved party with two courses of action in
the event of repudiation: he may await performance, or he may resort
immediately to any other Code remedy for breach.75 Although these
options originated with the common law,7" the Code, by permitting an
77
aggrieved party to wait only for a commercially reasonable time
before pursuing a remedy, renounces the earlier rule allowing an
injured party to await performance until the contractual delivery
date. 78 Enforcement of the limitation placed by section 2-610 upon the
70. For the pertinent text of § 2-723 see note 69 supra.
71. The interaction between § 2-713 and § 2-723 may produce anomalous results.
Cases with similar factual situations could generate substantially different

damage awards, varying only with the time at which the action was brought to
trial.
72. For the text of § 2-711 see note 49 supra.
73. U.C.C. § 2-711 (1) (b).
74. Id.
75. For the text of § 2-610 see note 6 supra.
76. See notes 50-56 supra & accompanying text.

77. U.C.C. § 2-610(a).
78. See generally Leibson, Anticipatory Repudiation and Buyer's Damages-A
Look into How the UCC Has Changed the Common Law, 7 U.C.C.L.J. 272 (1975).
In support of this conclusion, the original version of § 2-610 codified the common
law and contained no limit on the length of time an injured party could await
performance. U.C.C. § 2-610 (a) (1952 version). The subsequent modification of
the provision clearly indicated the drafters' intent to modify the earlier rule.
Section 2-610 involves a repudiation "with respect to a performance not yet due
the loss of which will substantially impair the value of the contract." U.C.C.
§ 2-610. Section 2-610 (a) permits the aggrieved party to await "performance by
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common law waiting period may require the measurement of damages
under section 2-713 as of a time prior to the date of performance.
Otherwise, an injured buyer would not be penalized for waiting until
the delivery date and for accumulating his losses in a rising market. 9
Section 2-712 also conflicts with an interpretation of section 2-713
that measures damages as of the date of delivery. Under section 2-712,
a buyer may cover by purchasing substitute goods without unreasonable delay after a "breach" has occurred within section 2-711. 80 Section 2-711, however, fails to mention breach; rather, it indexes a
purchaser's remedial options in the event of a nondelivery, a repudiation, or a rightful rejection or revocation of acceptance of the seller's
goods.8 ' Therefore, a seller's repudiation within section 2-711 apparently constitutes a breach within section 2-712, empowering the buyer
the repudiating party" for a reasonable time. If a contract for the sale of goods
is in the executory stage, the only substantial "performance" an injured buyer
may await is delivery. Because a seller cannot be required to deliver before the
performance date, § 2-610 (a) could be construed as permitting a buyer to wait for
a reasonable time after the performance date. The Code drafters, however, undoubtedly intended that the two uses of "performance" in § 2-610 be construed
differently and that under § 2-610(a) the buyer be allowed to await only some
preparatory performance indicating the seller's intention to retract his repudiation. Clearly, the drafters' designation of multiple meanings to a term appearing
twice in the same Code section is an example of careless draftsmanship.
79. The Code drafters intended to prevent a party who awaited performance
beyond a commercially reasonable period of time from recovering the "resulting
damages" that could have been avoided. U.C.C. § 2-610, Comment 1. Whether the
phrase "resulting damages" refers to compensatory, consequential, or both types
of damages, however, is unclear.
80. U.C.C. § 2-712(1). Section 2-712 provides:
"Cover"; Buyer's Procurement of Substitute Goods
(1) After a breach within the preceding section the buyer may
"cover" by making in good faith and without unreasonable delay
any reasonable purchase of or contract to purchase goods in substitution for those due from the seller.
(2) The buyer may recover from the seller as damages the difference between the cost of cover and the contract price together with
any incidental or consequential damages as hereinafter defined (Section 2-715), but less expenses saved in consequence of the seller's
breach.
(3) Failure of the buyer to effect cover within this section does not
bar him from any other remedy.
81. U.C.C. § 2-711 (1). For the text of § 2-711 see note 49 supra. A buyer's
rejection of the goods or revocation of his previous acceptance technically is not
a breach by the seller. Although the Code draftsmen clearly intended that the
term "breach" in § 2-712 should refer to a seller's nonconforming tender that
provides the basis for a purchaser's rightful rejection or revocation, their anomalous use of language in § 2-712 in referring to § 2-711's specific provisions is
another example of careless draftsmanship. See also note 78 supra.
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to obtain cover within a reasonable time. Not only does the Code's
deliberate rejection of the risk associated with common law cover
practices warrant the adoption of a new damage rule, 2 but an interpretation of section 2-713 requiring the measurement of damages only
on the contract's performance date also is inconsistent with section
2-712's reasonable time requirement. In fact, a performance date
measure permits the purchaser to cover at any time following the
repudiation, inasmuch as section 2-712 indicates that a buyer who
covers after a reasonable period still may compute his damages under
section 2-713. 13 Thus, if the buyer covered close to the date of performance so that the market price on the delivery date was equal to
his cover price, the measurement of damages as of the performance
date essentially would award the cost of his alternative goods, even
though he made his substitute purchase after the reasonable time limitation imposed by section 2-712.
In addition to obviating the reasonable time requirement in section
2-712, a performance date measure under section 2-713 may encourage aggrieved buyers to deal in bad faith and may provide sellers with
damage liabilities that essentially are punitive rather than compensatory.8 4 For example, a buyer might cover covertly at any time following the repudiation and subsequently sue for damages under section
82. See text accompanying notes 48-49 supra.
83. U.C.C. § 2-712(3). For the text of this provision see note 80 supra. See also
note 84 infra.
84. The Code drafters apparently did not intend to require the mitigation of
compensatory damages by aggrieved buyers. Comment 3 to U.C.C. § 2-712
provides:
Subsection (3) expresses the policy that cover is not a mandatory
remedy for the buyer. The buyer is always free to choose between
cover and damages for non-delivery under the next section.
However, this subsection must be read in conjunction with the
section which limits the recovery of consequential damages to such
as could not have been obviated by cover.
(emphasis supplied). If damages for nondelivery are measured on the performance date, as intended by the drafters, this Comment permits their accumulation in a rising market, placing no duty on the buyer to cover before the date of
delivery and thereby to mitigate his losses. The drafters only limited the recovery
of consequential damages rather than "resulting damages," the term used in
Comment 1 of U.C.C. § 2-610, see note 79 supra, by a purchaser who fails to buy
substitute goods. The statement that consequential damages are limited to those
that "could not have been obviated by cover" is in accord with the common law
rule. At common law, however, the term "consequential damages" referred to
damages for losses occurring after the date of performance resulting from a
buyer's inability to meet his resale obligations. See text accompanying notes 4546 supra. Provided that a buyer purchases substitute goods in time to satisfy his
resale customers, regardless of whether the cover takes place within a reasonable
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2-713. If the price of the goods on the performance date was higher
than the price of the substitute goods, the purchaser would be overcompensated for his losses.8 5 Moreover, having no need for substitute
goods, a purchaser might fail to attempt any cover, notwithstanding
the accessibility of an alternative supply, and wait to sue until after
the delivery date merely to maximize his recovery from the seller.
Assuming that market prices are rising between the time of repudiation and the date of performance, section 2-713 provides little incentive for a purchaser to cover under section 2-712 within a reasonable
period after a repudiation. Clearly, an alternative to the common law
method of measuring damages under section 2-713 is desirable.
DamagesMeasured as of the Repudiation Date
Section 2-713 may be construed as requiring that damages be measured as of the date on which the seller repudiates his contract. Although this interpretation derives support both from the express
language of section 2-713 and from several additional Code provisions,
it conflicts with other sections of the Code. Moreover, in its enforcement, a repudiation date construction fails to protect the interests of
the aggrieved buyer adequately.
The repudiation date interpretation draws its strongest support
from the express language of section 2-713.s 6 As noted by two authors,
the most obvious reading of that provision is that a buyer learns of
a breach when he learns of the breaching party's repudiation ;87 therefore, damages should be measured accordingly. Further, a settled rule
of statutory construction requires that a statute be given its plain and
natural meaning if its language is clear.88 Thus, the supposition that
the Code drafters intended section 2-713 to require the measurement
of damages as of the repudiation date is reasonable.
Sections 2-712 (1) and 2-610 (b) and several leading commentators
period following the repudiation, he suffers no losses for which consequential
damages can be awarded. Thus, except in an unlikely situation in which substitute goods are unavailable after a reasonable period of time following the
repudiation, the purported limitation on the recovery of consequential damages
provides no incentive whatever for a buyer to obtain an early cover and thereby
to mitigate his losses in a rising market.
85. One commentator suggests that a buyer should be permitted to cover and
sue subsequently for damages under § 2-713. Peters, supra note 12, at 260-61.
See note 101 infra.
86. For the text of § 2-713 see note 7 supra.
87. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 198.
88. See, e.g., 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.01
(4th ed. 1973).
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advance the view that a breach occurs at the time of the repudiation.8
As noted, section 2-712 apparently has equated the terms "breach"
and "repudiation." 90 Similarly, section 2-610 (b) permits an aggrieved
party confronted with an anticipatory repudiation to pursue any of
the Code's remedies for breach, 91 implying thereby that the two terms
are synonymous. Because the Code regards a repudiation as a breach
of contract, an injured buyer could learn of the breach under section
2-713 when he learned of the seller's repudiation.
Although the breach may occur at the time of repudiation, neither
the common law nor the legislative history of the Code supports the
92
view that damages under section 2-713 be measured on that date.
Moreover, section 2-723 implicitly counsels against the adoption of a
repudiation date interpretation of section 2-713. Such a construction
of the latter section would render the former provision, which requires that damages in anticipatory repudiation suits reaching trial
before the performance date be measured according to the market
price "at the time when the aggrieved party learned of the repudiation," 93 entirely superfluous as its relates to section 2-713.04 Finally,
a repudiation date measure of damages under section 2-713 cannot be
reconciled with section 2-610 (a), which permits an aggrieved party
to await performance by the repudiating party for a reasonable
time.95 In effect, such a damage measure would negate substantially
an injured purchaser's right to await performance: because a seller's
repudiation generally occurs in a rising market, an aggrieved buyer
would be forced to take immediate remedial action 9 6 and to make a
premature election of remedies.9 7 If substitute goods were inaccess89. See, e.g., 4 A. CORBIN, sup'ra note 4, § 981; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §
318 (1932).
90. See notes 80-81 supra & accompanying text.
91. For the text of § 2-610 see note 6 supra.
92. See notes 15, 59-74 supra & accompanying text. For example, § 338, Comment a in the RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS (1932), provides in. part:
a. The fact that an anticipatory repudiation is a breach of contract
... does not cause the repudiated promise to be treated as if it were
a promise to render performance at the date of repudiation. Repudiation does not accelerate the time fixed for performance; nor does it
change the damages to be awarded ...
93. U.C.C. § 2-723 (1). For the pertinent text of § 2-723 see note 69 supra.
94. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 200-01; notes 68-71 supra
& accompanying text.
95. U.C.C. § 2-610 (a). For the text of § 2-610 see note 6 supra.
96. See Anderson, supra note 10, at 18-19; Project, A Comparison of California
Sales Law and Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code, 11 U.C.L.A.L.
REv. 78, 125 (1963).

97. See Comment, Anticipatory Repudiation Under the Uniform Commercial
Code: Interpretation,Analysis, and Problems, 30 Sw. L.J. 601, 617 (1976).
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ible, the buyer would suffer noncompensable losses. Consequently, by
placing an absolute duty of mitigation upon an aggrieved buyer, a
repudiation date measure produces inequitable results for injured
purchasers. This inequity commends implementation of an alternative
damage measurement under section 2-713.
Damages Measured as of a Reasonable Time After Repudiation
As with the other possible interpretations of section 2-713, a construction requiring the measurement of damages as of a reasonable
time following the repudiation cannot be reconciled perfectly with the
remainder of the Code. Moreover, such an interpretation deviates
both from the common law and the Code drafters' intentions. Nevertheless, a reasonable time measure complements the two important
policies adopted by the Code in sections 2-610 (a) and 2-712 and offers
the courts a standard for ascertaining damages that yields the most
equitable results for buyers and sellers.
Section 2-610 (a) strongly supports a reasonable time interpretation of section 2-713. In limiting the time that an injured buyer may
await the performance of a repudiating seller,9 8 section 2-610 (a)
implies that a purchaser should not be permitted to receive compensation for his losses resulting from an increase in market prices after
a reasonable period has elapsed. 99 Clearly, a construction of section
2-713 requiring damages to be measured at a reasonable time after
the repudiation aids in the enforcement of section 2-610 (a). Moreover, this interpretation of section 2-713 comports with the Code's
cover remedy in section 2-712. By establishing a uniform standard for
calculating compensable losses, both provisions would provide an
injured buyer with only those damages amassed before the expiration
of a reasonable time after his seller's repudiation. 0 0 Because damages
could never exceed the amount calculated at the time the purchaser
should have covered, a reasonable period construction of section 2-713
would discourage buyers from either covering covertly or delaying the
98. U.C.C. § 2-610 (a). For the text of § 2-610 see note 6 supra.
99. Warning that an aggrieved party who waited beyond a reasonable time
cannot recover the "resulting damages" that he could have avoided, U.C.C. §
2-610, Comment 1, the Code drafters may have been referring to the compensatory
damages accumulating after a commercially reasonable time following the repudiation. See note 79 supra & accompanying text.
100. Section 2-712 expressly limits the cover option to those buyers who purchase substitute goods without unreasonable delay, U.C.C. § 2-712(1). See notes
80-85 supra & accompanying text. For the text of § 2-712 see note 80 supra.
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purchase of substitute goods in an attempt to maximize their losses
in an inflationary market.'1 1
A reasonable time interpretation of section 2-713 produces more
equitable results than would be possible under the other potential
constructions of the provision. As noted, a repudiation date measure
could impose serious losses upon an aggrieved buyer who is unable to
101. Thus, the reasonable time interpretation of § 2-713 prevents the occurrence of those conflicts between §§ 2-712 and 2-713 that would accompany a performance date measure. See notes 83-85 supra & accompanying text. With respect
to a circumstance involving the buyer's covert cover, Professor Peters has noted
that although Comment 5 to § 2-713 purports to limit the application of § 2-713
to situations in which the buyer failed to obtain a reasonable cover, the Code
itself does not prohibit the buyer from making substitute purchases and then
suing for damages under § 2-713. Peters, supra note 12, at 260-61. Therefore,
Peters suggests that the purchaser should be permitted both to cover and to sue
under § 2-713: "[Permitting such action would be] a good deal easier to administer, since it would be most difficult to ferret out from a reluctant complainant
information about transactions sufficiently related to the contract in breach to
qualify as cover or resale." Id. at 261. If the author means that the purchaser
who obtains alternative goods would be reluctant to disclose whether he actually
had covered or simply that he may be unwilling to disclose his purchase and
resale prices, a reasonable period measure under § 2-713 would resolve these
problems. Thus, the buyer could be permitted to elect a § 2-712 or § 2-713 remedy
because the potential recovery under either provision would be substantially
equivalent. Consistent with her analysis, Peters advocates the adoption of the
reasonable time interpretation of § 2-713. Id. at 267. In suggesting that the Code
should be construed to permit a buyer who covers to sue subsequently under
§ 2-713, the author may be concerned that the denial of this option might withhold recovery from an injured party who makes many purchases after a repudiation but cannot prove which goods were intended to serve as cover. This problem
of proof, however, need not result in a denial to the purchaser of a remedy under
§ 2-712; instead, a court could measure damages as the average of the market
prices for the qualifying § 2-712 purchases that reasonably might contain substitute merchandise. See R.N. Kelly Cotton Merchant, Inc. v. Cox, 295 Ala. 94, 323
So.2d 426, 429 (1976) ; cf. Chemetron Corp. v. McLouth Steel Corp., 381 F. Supp.
245, 259 (N.D. Ill. 1974), aff'd, 522 F.2d 469 (7th Cir. 1975) (damages for lost
profits resulting from a failure to deliver goods intended for resale measured
under § 2-715 as the difference between contract price and average market price
at which buyer would have resold).
Peters also argues, however, that "preservation of the option [to cover under
§ 2-712 and then sue under § 2-713] encourages recourse to actual market substitutes, since it guarantees to the injured party that he will not lose all remedy
in the event of an unusually favorable substitute contract." Peters, supra note
12, at 261. The author thus suggests that a buyer should be able to sue for
damages, even though he has procured substitute goods at a price more favorable
than had been provided in the repudiated contract. Neither the Code nor common
law supports such a principle. Cf., e.g., Acme Mills & Elevator Co. v. Johnson, 141
Ky. 718, 133 S.W. 784 (1911) (damage recovery for breach of contract disallowed
when contract price exceeded market price on date of delivery).
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cover, 0 2 and the adoption of the common law performance date measure would encourage a buyer to accumulate unnecessary losses. 0 3 An
interpretation of section 2-713 that requires the measurement of
damages as of a reasonable time after a repudiation would avoid both
of these problems. Moreover, it could be enforced equitably. Thus, in
a situation in which replacement goods were unavailable, a reasonable
time after repudiation logically would extend to the date of per04
formance.
Several conflicts arise, however, if section 2-713 is construed to
require that damages be measured at a reasonable time following a
repudiation. For example, this rationale cannot be reconciled with
section 2-723, which provides that damages in anticipatory repudiation suits reaching trial before the contractual date of performance be
measured as of the repudiation date. 10 5 If the drafters had intended
to incorporate into the Code a reasonable time rule for calculating
damages, then the special measure in section 2-723 would have been
necessary only in those instances when the trial began before a
reasonable period had elapsed. Of greater significance, a reasonable
time interpretation of section 2-713 alters the longstanding common
law damage rule in a manner unintended by the Code's drafters. The
Code's legislative history suggests strongly that damages should be
measured as of the date of delivery 106 and offers no indication that
the drafters modified the common law rule applicable to anticipatory
repudiations.
Nevertheless, as previously noted, a court construing section 2-713
cannot adopt an interpretation that implements the Code's entire anticipatory repudiation scheme as foreseen by the drafters. Both a repudiation and a performance date measure conflict with various restrictions in sections 2-610 (a) and 2-712.10 Yet, the inclusion of those
provisions in the Code evidences the drafters' deliberate intention to
abandon certain common law concepts, and section 2-713's ultimate
construction should comport with those reform efforts. Moreover, because section 2-712 eliminates the buyer's risk of covering prior to the
102. See text accompanying notes 96-97 supra.
103. See notes 30-32, 84-85 supra & accompanying text.
104. See Cargill, Inc. v. Stafford, 553 F.2d 1222, 1227 (10th Cir. 1977). A practical difficulty with the reasonable period interpretation is that it may require the
determination of damages in a rapidly fluctuating market. This problem could be
resolved by calculating damages from the average of the daily market prices
existing over a reasonable period following a repudiation. Presently, courts
average market prices when measuring damages. See note 101 supra.
105. U.C.C. § 2-723 (1). For the pertinent text of § 2-723 see note 69 supra.
106. See notes 57-74 supra & accompanying text.
107. See notes 75-85, 95-97 supra & accompanying text.
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performance date,0 8 strict adherence to the common law damage
measures appears unnecessary, and the reasonable time interpretation would be the most appropriate construction of section 2-713.
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTION 2-713: CASE LAW
UNDER THE CODE

Only three cases have addressed directly the question of damage
measurement under the Code for an anticipatory repudiation; in two,
the courts measured damages as of the repudiation date. Nevertheless,
both courts offered different reasons for their conclusions, and neither
gave sufficient consideration to the various possible interpretations
of section 2-713. In Oloffson v. Coomer,0 9 a 1973 decision by the Appellate Court of Illinois, two contracts made by the parties in April required the defendant, Coomer, to deliver corn in October and December. Less than two months after the contracts were signed, Coomer
repudiated; because of exceptionally heavy rainfall, he decided against
planting corn. Despite these exigencies, Oloffson refused to accept the
repudiation and insisted that Coomer make the promised deliveries.
Covering only after both performance dates had passed, Oloffson
made his substitute purchases when the market price for corn substantially exceeded both the original contract price and the price
on the repudiation date.
At trial, Oloffson contended unsuccessfully that damages should
be measured as of the contractual dates of delivery; in sustaining the
trial judge's decision to calculate damages as of the repudiation
date, 1 0 however, the Illinois Appellate Court determined that Oloffson's right under section 2-610 (a) to await performance was limited
to a commercially reasonable time and was conditioned on his dealing
with Coomer in good faith."' Oloffson failed to comply with either
restriction.
In discussing section 2-610, the court noted that the reasonable time
limitation contained in subsection (a) restricts a buyer's common law
privilege to await a repudiating seller's performance until the contractual date of delivery. 1 2 Moreover, in Oloffson's situation the
commercially reasonable time terminated on the day of the repudiation, because Coomer's renunciation of the contract was unequivocal
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

See notes 33-37, 48, 80 supra & accompanying text.
11 Ill. App. 3d 918, 296 N.E.2d 871 (1973).
Id. at 921, 296 N.E.2d at 873.
Id., 296 N.E.2d at 874.
Id.
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and substitute goods were readily available." 3 To the extent that the
court based its decision on Oloffson's failure to act in good faith,'1
however, the underlying rationale for its discussion of section 2-610
and its subsequent approval of the repudiation date damage measure
are ambiguous. Oloffson's bad faith resulted from his failure to disclose to Coomer a usage of trade enabling sellers to cancel their contracts by informing the buyer of their intent not to perform and paying the difference between the contract and market prices on the
date of cancellation." 5 In effect, the court reprimanded Oloffson by
refusing to extend the buyer's permissible waiting period beyond the
date on which he would have been required to cover if Coomer had
been informed of the trade usage.""
The second decision measuring damages as of the repudiation date
is Sawyer Farmers Cooperative Association v. Linke," 7 decided in
1975 by the Supreme Court of North Dakota. Wheat farmer Linke
agreed to deliver grain to the Association sometime between July and
October, the specific date to be determined by the Association. The
contract included a liquidated damage clause providing that in the
event of nondelivery Linke would pay the Association the difference
between the contractual price and "the highest market value of the
same grain and grade on [the] date this contract is closed by the
buyer, and the grain ordered in or any date thereafter to which the
time for delivery may have been extended by the buyer." 11 Linke renounced the agreement on August 15, but the Association neither accepted the repudiation nor attempted to pursue a contractual remedy.
Instead, it waited until October 1 before demanding delivery and
113. Id. at 922, 296 N.E.2d at 874. Because the Code apparently requires that
all repudiations be unequivocal, the court erroneously may have considered this
factor in determining that a reasonable time had elapsed. If Coomer's disavowal
of the contract had been ambiguous, no repudiation would have occurred; instead,
Oloffson could have demanded that Coomer make adequate assurances of future
performance. See U.C.C. § 2-609; note 43 supra.
114. 11 Ill. App. 3d at 922-23, 296 N.E.2d at 874. Two standards of good faith
appear in the Code. U.C.C. §§ 1-201(19), 2-103(1) (b). Section 1-201(19) defines
the term as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned." For a
merchant, § 2-103(1) (b) defines good faith to mean "honesty in fact and the
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade."
115. Oloffson testified that Coomer had failed to inquire as to the trade usage,
stating: "I'm no information sender. If he had asked I would have told him
exactly what to do .... I didn't feel [it was] my responsibility. I thought it his
to ask, in which case I would tell him exactly what to do." 11 Ill. App. 3d at 922,
296 N.E.2d at 875.
116. Id.
117. 231 N.W.2d 791 (N.D. 1975).
118. Id. at 793.
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brought suit only after Linke had reiterated his refusal to perform.
Construing the agreement to require the measurement of damages as
of the contract's closing, by whatever means, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision to calculate damages
as of August 15, the date of repudiation." 9 The court determined that
the agreement was closed when the actual repudiation occurred; it
relied on the Code, recent cases, and the views of commentators to
support its decision that an anticipatory repudiation need not be "accepted" to constitute a breach.' 20 Linke's repudiation, therefore, automatically closed the contract, and the liquidated damages provision of
the parties' agreement required that damages be measured according
to the market price on that date.
Subsequent to Oloffson and Sawyer Farmers, generalizations regarding judicial interpretations of section 2-713 in situations involving anticipatory repudiations remained impossible.' 21 The particular
circumstances of those cases enabled the two courts to avoid examining the ramifications of the alternative damage measures'possible
under section 2-713. In Oloffson, the plaintiff's bad faith was integral
to the court's adoption of a repudiation date measure; in Sawyer
Farmers,the contract itself included a damage measure. Nevertheless,
in both cases the courts evinced a willingness to accept a time other
than a contractual date for delivery as the time of the breach. Moreover, in Oloffson the court clearly was influenced by the restriction
enunciated in section 2-610, which mandates corrective action by a
buyer within a reasonable period after the repudiation.' 22 Because a
seller usually repudiates in a rising market, these judicial considerations might have been construed to impose on an aggrieved buyer a
23
general duty to mitigate his damages.'
119. Id. at 794.
120. Id. at 794-95. See also notes 54-56, 89-91 supra & accompanying text.
121. Cf. Hurt v. Earnhart, Tenn. App. -,
539 S.W.2d 133 (1976), in
which the court measured damages under § 2-713 as of the repudiation date. Because both parties requested specifically that this damage measurement be
applied, however, Hurt provides little guidance for future interpretations of §
2-713.
122. The requirement in Oloffson that an aggrieved buyer must cover on the
repudiation date if substitute goods are readily accessible was cited with apparent
approval in Farmers Elevator Co. v. Lyle, S.D. -,
-,
238 N.W.2d 290,
295 (1976).
123. See also Ralston Purina Co. v. McNabb, 381 F. Supp. 181, 183 (W.D.
Tenn. 1974) (aggrieved buyer of soybeans who had knowledge that seller would
be unable to deliver "could not, in good faith, modify its contracts with [the
seller] in a way which would, in view of past weather conditions and the trend
in the market, almost inevitably result in compounding, rather than limiting, any
injury to" the buyer). But see note 84 supra.
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The issue of damage measurement under the Code for anticipatory
repudiation thus was unsettled in 1977, when the Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit, in Cargill,Inc. v. Stafford,12 4 adopted the reasonable time interpretation of section 2-713.125 In Cargill, Stafford, a
grain elevator operator, contracted over the telephone on July 31 with
Cargill, a cash merchandiser of agricultural commodities, to deliver
26,000 bushels of wheat by September 30. Dissatisfied with a provision in Cargill's written confirmation of the contract enabling the
buyer to cancel, Stafford repudiated the agreement in a letter received
by Cargill on August 24. Thereafter, the buyer urged performance
from Stafford until September 6, when Cargill cancelled the contract
and claimed that Stafford owed it the difference between the contract
price and the September 6 market price. Nevertheless, at trial, Cargill
argued that it should receive damages calculated on the repudiation
date or, in the alternative, on the date of performance. The trial court
instead selected September 6 as the time to measure damages. 2 "
On appeal from the lower court's decision, the court of appeals
determined that the time the buyer "learns of the breach" in anticipatory repudiation cases is the time of performance. 27 Reasoning that
the Code drafters had not intended to alter the common law measurement of damages, the court concluded that "under [section 2-713]
damages normally should be measured from the time when performance is due and not from the time when the buyer learns of the repudiation." 128 The court further rejected Cargill's argument that damages should be based on the repudiation date, distinguishing both
Oloffson and Sawyer Farmers. Unlike Sawyer Farmers,the damages
29
in Cargill were not measured pursuant to a contractual provision.
In Otoffson, the commercially reasonable time for which the buyer
could suspend his performance under section 2-610 (a) ended on the
date of repudiation because substitute goods were readily accessible
and because the Code's obligation of good faith imposed additional
30
time limitations.
124. 553 F.2d 1222 (10th Cir. 1977).
125. Id. at 1227.
126. Id. at 1225.
127. Id. at 1226.
128. Id. See also notes 57-74 supra & accompanying text.
129. 553 F.2d at 1226. See text accompanying note 118 supra. Although the
court in Sawyer Farmers measured damages pursuant to a liquidated damages

provision, it initially had to determine the date of the breach. If damages under
§ 2-713 are to be measured at the time of the breach, the court in Cargill erred in
disregarding Sawyer Farmer's analysis.

130. 553 F.2d at 1226.
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Despite the court's determination that damages under section 2-713
should be measured as of the performance date, it nonetheless concluded: "If substitution is readily available and buyer does not cover
within a reasonable time, damages should be based on the price at the
end of that reasonable time rather than on the price when performance is due." 131 This statement, which diametrically opposes the
court's earlier conclusion regarding damage measurement on the performance date, in effect insures that the performance date measures
will not be implemented unless a valid reason exists to refuse to
32
cover.
In reaching its conclusion adopting the reasonable time interpretation of section 2-713, the court in Cargill was influenced by section
2-712's requirement that cover be completed without unreasonable
delay. 33 In fact, the court's analysis suggests that Comment 1 of section 2-713, which provides that "[t]he general baseline adopted in this
section uses as a yardstick the market in which the buyer would have
obtained cover had he sought that relief," '34 codifies the reasonable
time interpretation of the provision. Such an assertion, however, conflicts with the court's prior determination that the Code drafters intended to adopt the performance date construction of section 2-713.3
More importantly, the court's indication that Comment 1 supports a
reasonable time damage measure in the event of an anticipatory
repudiation overlooks the history of the provision. Written in 1952,
Comment 1 accompanied the original version of section 2-713,13 which
measured damages in terms of nondelivery. In 1962, when the present
version of section 2-713 was adopted, Comment 1 was not modified
to reflect any variations in its previous interpretation. Because of the
drafter's silence, the Comment actually supports the performance date
interpretation rather than the reasonable time construction of section
2-713.137
The court's inadequate explanation of its contradictory constructions of section 2-713 diminishes Cargill's precedential value. If the
court had recognized that none of the three possible interpretations of
section 2-713 harmonizes completely with other Code provisions, it
could have implemented. the reasonable time measurement as the con131. Id. at 1227.
132. Id.
133. Id. For the text of § 2-712 see note 80 supra.
134. U.C.C. § 2-713 Comment 1. For the text of Comment I see note 65 supra.
135. 553 F.2d at 1226.
136. U.C.C. § 2-713 (1952 version). For the text of the 1952 version of § 2-713
see text accompanying note 61 supra.
137. See text accompanying note 67 supra.
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struction most conforming to the Code drafter's entire anticipatory
repudiation scheme.
Notwithstanding the defects in Cargill's rationale, the decision is
valuable in having adopted the most appropriate interpretation of section 2-713. In addition, the case continues the trend of Oloffson and
Sawyer Farmers in accepting a time other than the performance date
as the time of breach in an anticipatory repudiation case under the
Code. Moreover, Cargillextends previous case law by recognizing that
section 2-712, as well as section 2-610 (a), may limit the maximum
compensatory losses that a buyer may recover in an anticipatory
repudiation suit. The Tenth Circuit's opinion therefore further promotes the emergence of a judicially imposed duty of mitigation on
13
aggrieved buyers. s
CONCLUSION

Because each of the three potential constructions of section 2-713
conflicts irreconcilably with other Code sections, a definitive interpretation of the several provisions on a buyer's remedies in the event of
anticipatory repudiation is impossible. Nevertheless, a reasonable time
measure is the preferable construction of the provision. Such an
interpretation would complement the common law reforms incorporated by the Code's drafters in sections 2-610 and 2-712 and thereby
prohibit the inequitable results possible under either a repudiation or
a performance date measure. In addition, a reasonable time construction could implement any sensible duty of mitigation imposed by the
judiciary upon an aggrieved buyer. Finally, by encouraging a purchaser to resort to the Code's cover remedy encompassed in section
2-712, the adoption of a reasonable time damage measure under section 2-713 would promote the renewed flow of commerce in the event
of a seller's anticipatory repudiation.
138. See note 123 supra & accompanying text.

